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Abstract—This paper proposes an efficient algorithm to perform privacy-preserving (PP) facial expression classification (FEC) in
the client-server model. The server holds a database and offers the classification service to the clients. The client uses the service
to classify the facial expression (FaE) of subject. It should be noted that the client and server are mutually untrusted parties and
they want to perform the classification without revealing their inputs to each other. In contrast to the existing works, which rely
on computationally expensive cryptographic operations, this paper proposes a lightweight algorithm based on the randomization
technique. The proposed algorithm is validated using the widely used JAFFE and MUG FaE databases. Experimental results
demonstrate that the proposed algorithm does not degrade the performance compared to existing works. However, it preserves
the privacy of inputs while improving the computational complexity by 120 times and communication complexity by 31 percent
against the existing homomorphic cryptography based approach.
Index Terms—Privacy, security, facial expression, classification, encrypted domain.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Facial expression classification (FEC) forms a critical
capability desired by human-interacting systems that
aim to be responsive to variations in the human’s
emotional state [1]–[3]. Automatic recognition of FaEs
can be an important component in human-machine
interfaces, human emotion analysis and medical care.
However, the task of automatically recognizing the
various FaEs is challenging [4]–[6].
The FEC could be automated by establishing a com-
puting infrastructure capable of executing machine
learning algorithms and building a database of facial
images with different expressions. These requirements
may not achievable by small organizations. Even if we
assume that the requirement can be met by organiza-
tions, then they need a dedicated team to maintain
the infrastructure which may not be necessary when
cheaper computational power and services can be
obtained from cloud providers. Hence, it is reasonable
to assume that any organization can obtain the FEC
as a service from cloud provider or any other modern
computing infrastructure.
If the FEC is outsourced to modern computing in-
frastructures then it involves third party servers who
deliver FEC as a service via the Internet. Initially, the
server sets up a database with training facial images
from various expression classes and extracts the dis-
criminative features of these images that correspond
to each class in order to simplify the classification.
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A client requesting the service would supply a test
image whose expression it desires to recognize. In re-
sponse the server extracts the discriminative features
from the test image and compares them against the
features of training images in order to find the test
image’s expression.
However, due to privacy concerns, the client re-
questing the service may not wish to disclose the
contents of the facial image or the classification results
(i.e., which expression is present in the current test
facial image) to the server; while the server desires
that the service does not leak out information to the
client on the reference facial images that it holds in
its database. As an example, a doctor may wish for
her patients’ emotions to be automatically recognized
(rather than manually as this will be time-consuming),
through the aid of a FaE database hosted on a remote
server. In order to address any privacy concerns that
may result from revealing patient images without
explicit consent, this should be performed without
leaking the contents of the patients’ face images nor
even the classification results to the server.
The challenge hence becomes the question of how
to perform the classification collaboratively between
two mutually distrusting parties without revealing the
private contents of the images held by either party;
and without revealing the result to the server. In liter-
ature this challenge was addressed by exploiting state-
of-the-art cryptographic techniques such as homomor-
phic encryption and secure multi-party computations.
However, these techniques preserve the privacy at
the cost of heavy computational and communication
complexities to the clients. In this paper, we propose
an efficient solution to address the above challenge.
The contributions of this paper are
C1 : develop a lightweight solution for FEC without
using computationally intensive cryptographic
techniques
C2 : at the same time achieve classification accuracy
equivalent to the accuracy of the conventional
non-PP algorithm
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
We review the related works in Section 2. Notation
and mathematical tools required for our algorithm
are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe
the conventional FEC algorithm (i.e., without privacy
requirements). In Section 5, we propose the efficient
algorithm to achieve privacy during the classifica-
tion followed by security and privacy analysis. Per-
formance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed in
Section 6. Conclusions are discussed in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORKS
There are several classification algorithms developed
in pattern recognition and machine learning for var-
ious applications [7]. Few of them in the literature
have been redesigned for PP classification ( [8]–[15],
[29] and references therein). Majority of these are de-
veloped for distributed setting where different parties
hold parts of the training database and securely train
a common classifier without each party needing to
disclose its own training data to other parties [9], [10].
The work in [9] proposed for the first time a
strongly privacy-enhanced protocol for support vec-
tor machine (SVM) using cryptographic primitives
whereas the authors assumed that the training data
is distributed. Hence, in order to preserve the privacy
they developed a protocol to perform secure kernel
sharing, prediction and training using secret sharing
and homomorphic encryption techniques. At the end
of the training, each party will hold a share of the
secret. In the testing phase, all parties collaboratively
perform the classification using their shared secrets.
At the end of the protocol, each party will hold the
share of the predicted class label.
PP data classification algorithms suitable for client-
server model were studied in [8], [11]–[15], [29]. The
client-server model substantially reduces the compu-
tational and communication overhead to the client
since s/he needs to interact with only one server
compared to the distributed setting. The work in
[8] proposes a PP face recognition algorithm using
cryptographic techniques. Outsourcing the clinical
decision support system to the third-party server
without violating the client’s privacy was studied
in [15]. Similarly several plain domain classification
algorithms were redesigned in [11]–[14] to perform
PP classifications.
The PP algorithm for FEC algorithm was studied in
[29]. The work in [29] is a variant of [8]. Even though,
at high level, there are similarities between [8] and
[29] in the PP computation part, there are significant
differences between both the schemes. The scheme
in [8] uses principal component analysis (PCA) for
feature extraction and then nearest neighbor (NN)
classifier. One problem that can be associated with
PCA is that it is very sensitive to variations in expres-
sion, illumination, occlusion etc. In order to overcome
this drawback, Belhumeur et. al proposed a technique
called Fisher Linear Discriminant Analysis (FLDA) in
[23] and showed that the method in [23] has lower
error rates that than PCA based technique. However,
FLDA tends to give undesired results if image sam-
ples in a particular class have many local means (i.e., a
multimodal class). In that case FLDA cannot preserve
the discriminative features of that particular class.
Local Fisher discriminant analysis (LFDA) has been
proposed to overcome drawbacks of FLDA [25]. Due
to this, [29] considers LFDA instead of PCA.
The work in [29] achieves the privacy requirements
by masking the test image and results using Paillier
homomorphic encryption [16]. Homomorphic cryp-
tosystems such as Paillier are public key cryptosys-
tems and use large keys for encryption and decryption
[16]. This involves computationally intensive opera-
tions such as exponentiation of very large numbers.
On the other hand, the homomorphic encryption used
for data classification schemes only perform limited
number of operations in the encrypted domain (either
addition or multiplication). Hence, more number of
interactions between the client and server is required
to obtain the result.
In contrast to all of these works, we propose a
lightweight PP FEC protocol based on randomization
technique. The protocol relies only on multiplication
and addition. However, we show later in this pa-
per that the new protocol achieves the privacy re-
quirements without degrading the classification per-
formance while improving the computational and
communication complexity compared to the existing
work.
3 PRELIMINARIES
We use boldface upper and lower case letters for
matrices and vectors; (.)T denotes the transpose oper-
ator; ∥.∥2 the Euclidean norm; ⌊.⌉ the nearest integer
approximation; ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. The
modular reduction operator is denoted by mod. vec
denotes vectorization operation which converts the
matrix into a column vector.
3.1 Kronecker product and identities
In mathematics, the Kronecker product, denoted by
⊗, is an operation on two matrices of arbitrary size
resulting in a block matrix. This product satisfies the
following two identities [17] (notations A, B, C, D,
and X to be used to define matrices with appropriate
sizes):
1. vec(AXB) = (BT ⊗A)vec(X)
2. (A⊗B)(C⊗D) = (AC)⊗ (BD)
3.2 Information-theoretic security
A security algorithm is information-theoretically se-
cure if its security is derived purely from information
theory. The concept of information-theoretically se-
cure communication was introduced in 1949 by Amer-
ican mathematician Claude Shannon, who used it to
prove that the one-time pad system archives perfect
security subject to the following two conditions [18]:
1. the key which randomizes the data should be
random and should be used only once
2. the key length should be at least as long as the
length of the data
If any algorithm randomizes its parameter and sat-
isfies the above conditions then the parameters can-
not be unmasked by an adversary even when the
adversary has unlimited computing power e.g., if
the message space and random space are equal to
1024−bits then prior probability (probability for a par-
ticular message out of 21024 possible messages) and
posterior probability (probability of inferring/mapping
a message in random domain to a message domain)
are equal i.e., there is no advantage for an adversary to
get higher posterior probability than prior probability.
3.3 Privacy-preserving secure two-party compu-
tation
This computation will be exploited to perform secure
operation between two parties. Let us assume one
party i.e., client knows a vector a and another party
i.e., server knows a vector b and scalar r. Both want to
interact with each other to compute aTb+r. However,
the outcome aTb+r must be known only to the client.
To compute r + aTb in private, we extend the PP
scalar multiplication algorithm in [19] . The complete
algorithm is presented in Table 1.
Let us assume that the client’s input a is composed
of integers while the server’s input b is composed of
floating points. Since we use integer random numbers,
the server converts the elements in b into integers by
scaling and nearest integer approximation operation.
This is a valid operation since we scale the vector, b,
and r by a large scalar, s, before computation (i.e.,
s.r + aT ⌊sb⌉) and divide the outcome by the same
scaling factor s (i.e., 1
s
(s.r + aT ⌊sb⌉) ≈ r + aTb).
Initially, the client adds different random values to
each of the elements in a as shown in Steps 7 to 10
in Table 1. Now the server executes the Steps from 14
to 21 and returns the outcome to the client. In Step
21, the server adds random number s.r.α2 to
∑l
i=1Di.
Theorem 1: The above two-party protocol is
information-theoretically secure i.e., the server cannot
infer the elements in client’s input vector a and the
client will only learn the final result but not the
elements in sever’s input vector b nor r.
TABLE 1
PP Secure Two-party Computation Algorithm to
Compute r + aTb Privately.
1. Input by Client: a = [a1, . . . , al]
T , where l < 216,
{(ai)∀ i} ∈ Zo1 with o1 ≤ 2
10
Input by Server: r, ⌊s.b⌉ = [⌊s.b1⌉, . . . , ⌊s.bl⌉]
T ,
where {s.r, (bi)∀ i} ∈ Zo2 with o2 ≤ 2
40
2. Output: r + 1
s
(⌊sa⌉Tb) (known only to the client)
Client first performs the following operations
3. choose primes α, β, where |α| = 80 bits and
β>(l.o1.o2 + o2 + 1).α
2, e.g., |β|>226 bits if l = 216
4. set K = 0 and choose l positive
random integers (c1, . . . , cl)
such that o2.
∑l
i=1 ci < α− o2.l and |ci| < 24 bits
5. for each element bi ∈ b do
6. choose random integer zi, compute zi.β such that
|zi.β| ≈ 1024 bits, and calculate ki = zi.β − ci
7. if bi > 0 then compute
8. Ci = ai.α+ ci + zi.β, K = K + ki
9. else if bi = 0 then compute
10. Ci = ci + zi.β, K = K + ki
11. end if
12. end for
13. send (α,C1, C2, . . . , Cn) to the server
Now server executes the following operations
14. for each element bi ∈ b do
15. if ⌊s.bi⌉ > 0 then compute
16. Di = ⌊s.bi⌉.α.Ci i.e., if ai > 0
→ Di = ⌊s.bi⌉.ai.α
2 + ⌊s.bi⌉.α.ci +⌊s.bi⌉.α.zi.β
if ai = 0 → Di = ⌊s.bi⌉.α.ci + ⌊s.ai⌉.α.zi.β
17. else if bi = 0 then compute
18. Di = Ci i.e., if ai > 0 → Di = ai.α+ ci + zi.β
if ai = 0 → Di = ci + zi.β
19. end if
20. end for
21. compute D = s.r.α2 +
∑l
i=1 Di and
return D to the client
Now client performs the following operations
22. compute E = D +K mod β
23. return E−(E mod α
2)
s.α2
which is equal to
r + 1
s
(⌊sb⌉Ta) ≈ aTb+ r
24. end procedure
Proof: To validate the security we consider both
the client and server are honest-but-curious i.e., they
will follow the procedures but try to learn about each
other’s input, intermediate values and result. Let us
show that the algorithm in Table 1 is information-
theoretically secure for the following two cases.
Case I–Honest-but-curious Server
In Table 1, the client randomizes his inputs ai, i =
1, . . . , l by 712-bits of freshly generated random inte-
gers zi, i = 1, . . . , l and sends Ci, i = 1, . . . , l to the
server (see Steps 3 to 13). The server is curious to infer
the clients data ai from Ci. The server can compute
the priori probabilities of random integer zi and data
ai based on the underlying stochastic process as well
as the posteriori probabilities of the various possible
ai and keys ci + ziβ which might have produced Ci.
According to information theory, as long as the size of
the client’s data is less than the random integer (i.e.,
|ci + ziβ| ≈ 1024-bits in this case) and the random
integers are fresh, then the server can only compute
identical priory and posteriori probabilities, hence
the client’s data is information-theoretically secure. In
Section 5.3 we show that the size of the client’s input
data is always less than 1024−bits.
Case II–Honest-but-curious Client
As shown in the Steps 14 to 21 in Table 1, the
server’s input data s.bi, i = 1, . . . , l is multiplied with
corresponding ai and then the results were added
to get
∑l
i=1 s.bi.ai in the randomized domain. The
curious client wants to infer
∑l
i=1 s.bi.ai or the servers
input from the result. The outcome is randomized by
s.r where r is freshly generated random value (we
avoided α2 in here for brevity). In fact the server
hides
∑l
i=1 bi.ai using s.r from the curious client. As
explained previously, the server can secure
∑l
i=1 bi.ai
information-theoretically if the size of the random
integer r is greater than the size of the outcome∑l
i=1 bi.ai. In Section 5.3, we show that the server can
determine the size of
∑l
i=1 bi.ai so that it can generate
larger integer s.r in order to achieve the information-
theoretic security.
Theorem 2: The algorithm in Table 1 is not vulnera-
ble to overflow errors.
Proof: Let us assume that elements in vectors a,
⌊s.b⌉, and s.ri take maximum possible values. Let us
denote elements in a can take maximum value of o1
and elements in ⌊s.b⌉ and s.ri can take maximum val-
ues of o2. Hence, if number of elements in a and ⌊s.b⌉
are equal to l, then output of the algorithm in Table 1
should be at most o2+l.o1.o2
s
. In order to verify this, let
us go through the Steps 8, 16, 21, 22, and 23 in Table 1:
Step 8 ⇒ Ci = o1.α+ci+zi.β, i = 1, . . . , l. Step 16 ⇒
Di = o2αCi = o2.o1.α
2+o2.α.ci+o2.α.zi.β, i = 1, . . . , l.
Step 21 ⇒ D = o2.α
2+
∑l
i=1Di = o2.α
2+ l.o1.o2.α
2+
o2.α.
∑l
i=1 ci+o2.
∑l
i=1 α.zi.β. Since K =
∑l
i=1(zi.β−
ci), and from Step 22 ⇒ E = D + K mod β =
o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + o2.α.
∑l
i=1 ci + o2.
∑l
i=1 α.zi.β +∑l
i=1(zi.β − ci) mod β = o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + (o2.α −
1).
∑l
i=1 ci. There is no further modulo reduction since
β > (l.o1.o2+ o2+1).α
2 (Step 3), o2.
∑n
i=1 ci < α− o2.l
(Step 4), and
E= o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + (o2.α− 1).
l∑
i=1
ci,
< o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + o2.α.
l∑
i=1
ci
< o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + (α2 − α.o2.l)
< o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 + α2
= l.o1.o2.α
2 + (o2 + 1).α
2 < β.
From Step 23, E mod α2 = o2.α
2 + l.o1.o2.α
2 +
(o2.α−1).
∑l
i=1 ci mod α
2 = (o2.α−1).
∑l
i=1 ci. There
is no further modulo reduction since om.
∑n
i=1 ci <
α − om.l (Step 4) and E mod α
2 = (o2.α −
1).
∑l
i=1 ci < om.α.
∑l
i=1 ci < α
2. Hence, from Step
23, E−(E mod α
2)
s.α2
= o2.α
2+l.o1.o2.α
2
s.α2
. The two-party
computation algorithm always output correct result.
4 FACIAL EXPRESSION CLASSIFICATION
A FEC involves two different phases: facial feature
extraction and classification. Facial feature extraction
involves extracting features of facial images; the re-
sulting feature vectors can then be used to project
the facial image from the higher dimensional image
space into a lower dimensional feature space while
preserving the discriminative features. Discriminative
features separate the facial images of one class from
facial images of other classes in the lower dimensional
feature space [20]. Better separation among classes in
the lower dimensional space leads to higher classifi-
cation rate.
PCA is one of the most widely used feature extrac-
tion (i.e., dimensionality reduction) methods in image
recognition and compression [20]–[22]. PCA aims to
obtain a set of mutually orthogonal bases that describe
the global information of the data points in terms of
variance. The drawback in PCA is that the scatter
being maximized is due not only to the between-
class scatter that is useful for classification, but also
to the within-class scatter. Maximization of within-
class scatter includes unwanted information to the
classification process [23].
The Fisher linear discriminant analysis (FLDA) [7],
[23], [24] has been proposed as alternative method
to overcome the drawbacks of PCA. In fact FLDA
preserves the discriminative features of images while
reducing dimension on the image space. FLDA ob-
tains the transformation matrix by maximizing the
between-class scatter matrix while minimizing the
within-class scatter matrix. However, it tends to give
undesired results if image samples in a particular class
have many local means (i.e., a multimodal class). In
that case FLDA cannot preserve the discriminative
features of that particular class. Local Fisher discrimi-
nant analysis (LFDA) has been proposed to overcome
drawbacks of FLDA [25]–[28]. Within this context, we
consider LFDA in the paper for feature extraction.
4.1 Local Fisher Discriminant Analysis
Suppose we have C number of expression classes,
let nc be the number of facial images for cth class,
where c ∈ {1, . . . , C} denotes the class index
(refer Table 2 for more notations). The total number
of facial images can thus be denoted as N =
∑C
c=1 nc.
Let us assume that each facial image is a real valued
grayscale image and can be represented as a matrix,
where each element corresponds to the pixel value of
a point within the image. A two-dimensional facial
image matrix can be converted to a one-dimensional
vector by stacking each column (or row) of the matrix
TABLE 2
Variables and their descriptions.
Variable Description
C
Number of different classes in the
training database
nc Number of images in the c
th class
N
Total number of images in the training
database
n Number of pixels per image
x˜i ith facial image (original)
x¯ Mean of the training database
xi
Difference training data sample of x˜i i.e.,
xi = x˜i − x¯
ui
This will be used to project the images
onto lower dimensional space
yi
Projected training images of xi in lower
dimension
t Difference test image i.e., t = t˜− x¯
w
Low dimensional vector corresponding to
t
di Euclidean distance between w and yi
into a long vector. Denote x˜i ∈ Z
n×1 as a vector
representation of the ith facial image.
Let us start with a training set of facial images
x˜i = [x˜1,i, . . . , x˜n,i]
T ∈ Zn×1, i = 1, . . . , N .
A classifier can be trained using the training data
samples to classify an unlabeled test sample. To do
this, let us denote the difference training data samples
as xi ∈ R
n×1, i = 1, . . . , N where,
xi = x˜i − x¯, ∀i, (1)
where x¯ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x˜i denotes the mean of the training
data samples.
Let us denote the projected image in the lower
dimensional feature space corresponding to the im-
age xi = [x1,i, . . . , xn,i]
T ∈ Rn×1 as yi =
[y1,i, . . . , ym,i]
T ∈ Rm×1, where m≪ n. Hence, yi can
be obtained by the following linear projection using
the LFDA transformation matrix U:
yi = U
Txi, i = 1, . . . , N, (2)
yk,i = u
T
k xi, k = 1, . . . ,m. (3)
In LFDA, the transformation matrix U maximizes the
local-between-class-scatter-matrix SB while minimiz-
ing the local-within-class-scatter-matrix SW:
U = argmax
V
| VTSBV |
| VTSWV |
, (4)
where, V represents the possible transformation ma-
trices i.e., the optimal V which maximizes the argu-
ment is equal to U,
SB =
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
Bi,j(xi − xj)(xi − xj)
T , (5)
SW =
1
2
N∑
i,j=1
Wi,j(xi − xj)(xi − xj)
T , (6)
where Bi,j and Wi,j are tuning parameters for LFDA.
Interesting readers can refer [25], [29] for more details.
4.2 Classification
In this paper, we consider 1-NN [31]. However, our
algorithm can be extended to k-NN and Hamming
distance based classifiers since these techniques and
1-NN are mathematically similar. 1-NN classifier pre-
dicts the matching class of the test image based on
the closest training image. Squared Euclidean dis-
tance calculation can be used to obtain the distances
between the test image and training images (i.e.,
in the lower dimension). In order to explain the
classification phase, let us denote a test image as
t˜ = [t˜1, . . . , t˜n]
T ∈ Zn×1 and difference test image
as t = [t1, . . . , tn]
T ∈ Rn×1, where
t = t˜− x¯. (7)
Denote the low dimensional vector corresponding to
t as w = [w1, . . . , wm]
T ∈ Rm×1 where m≪ n. Now
t is projected by the projection matrix as
w = UT t, (8)
wk = u
T
k t, k = 1, . . . ,m. (9)
The squared Euclidean distance, di, between w and
yi, i = 1, . . . , N is
di= ∥(w − yi)∥
2
2 = ∥(U
T t−UTxi)∥
2
2,
=
m∑
k=1
(
uTk tt
Tuk − 2u
T
k tu
T
k xi + u
T
k xix
T
i uk
)
.(10)
The decision rule of the 1-NN classifier is that the
training image x∗ is said to have same expression of
the test image if
d∗ = min{d1, . . . , dN}, (11)
where d∗ is smaller than a given threshold T . So far
we have discussed the traditional approach in which
both the training phase (i.e., feature extraction) and
the testing phase (i.e., classification) are carried out by
the same party. In the next section, we propose an ef-
ficient protocol where the training phase is performed
by one-party (i.e., server) whereas the testing phase is
collaboratively carried out between two-parties (i.e.,
between the client and server).
5 PRIVACY-PRESERVING FACIAL EXPRES-
SION CLASSIFICATION
In this section, we extend the algorithm explained
in Section 4 to perform PP FEC. The new algorithm
satisfies the following three requirements:
R1 : without using highly computationally intensive
public-key homomorphic encryption schemes
such as Paillier cryptographic system [16]
R2 : hide the client’s input data sample and the clas-
sification result from the server
R3 : hide the server side classification parameters such
as feature vectors and mean of the database from
the client
In order to explain the new algorithm, let us split the
testing phase of the traditional approach in Section 4
into four steps as follows:
S1 : obtain difference test image i.e., (7)
S2 : projecting the difference test image onto lower
dimension i.e., (8)
S3 : Euclidean distance calculation i.e., (10)
S4 : minimum distance calculation to match the test
image to a known class i.e., (11)
TABLE 3
Variables and their description. We use X (X) to
denote if the corresponding variable is known
(unknown) to one party.
Vari-
ables
Known only
to the Client
Known only to the Server
x˜i, x¯,
xi, yi,
ui
X X (see Table 2)
t
X (see
Table 2)
X
η˜
X (Noise
vector, same
dimension as
t˜)
X
η X
X (Difference noise
vector)
γ
X (differ-
ence
vector)
X
w¯ X
X (Lower dimensional
vector corresponding to η)
d¯i X
X (Euclidean distance
between between w¯ and yi
mi =
d¯i − di
X X
ri X
X (Random integer
generated by the server to
hide d¯i)
d˜i =
d¯i + ri
X X
rki,1,
rki,2,
rki,3,
rki,4
X
X (Random integers
generated by the server to
use during the secure
two-party computations)
In the following subsections, we explain how each
of these steps can be computed without violating the
above three requirements (R1 – R3). Since our method
preserves the privacy, we add the term “private” to
those four steps in order to distinguish our method
from the traditional approach. Definitions for the vari-
ables used in the following subsections are provided
in Table 3.
5.1 Obtain the difference test image in private
Initially, the difference test image needs to be obtained
for the classification. However, the client cannot send
the test image, t˜, due to the privacy concerns. Hence,
the client only sends noise vector, η˜ ∈ Zn×1, with
same dimension as test image. Since server receives
only the noise vector, it cannot get any information
about the test image vector. As shown in (7), the
server obtain the difference noise vector, η˜, instead
of difference noise vector, η, as follows:
η = η˜ − x¯. (12)
However, only the client knows the difference be-
tween the test image and the noise image. Let us
denote the difference as γ where
γ = η˜ − t˜ = η − t ∈ Zn×1. (13)
5.2 Projecting the difference noise vector onto
the lower dimension space in private
As shown in (8), the server projects the differ-
ence noise vector (instead of difference test im-
age) and obtains lower dimension vector, w¯ =
[w¯1, w¯2, . . . , w¯m] ∈ R
m×1, as follows:
w¯ = UTη, (14)
w¯k = u
T
k η, k = 1, . . . ,m. (15)
However, using (12), (13), t = t˜ − x¯, (9) and (15), we
can derive w¯k in terms of wk, k = 1, . . . ,m as follows:
w¯k = u
T
k (η˜ − x¯) = u
T
k [(˜t+ γ)− x¯],
= uTk [(˜t− x¯) + γ] = u
T
k (t+ γ),
= wk + u
T
k γ, k = 1, . . . ,m. (16)
The scalar uTk γ in (16) is unknown to the server.
Hence, the server uses only the w¯k, k = 1, . . . ,m ob-
tained in (15) for the distance calculation step instead
of wk, k = 1, . . . ,m. We show in Section 5.5 that the
server cannot infer wk from (16).
5.3 Euclidean distance calculation in private
Since the server has only computed w¯, let us denote
the Euclidean distance between w¯ and the low di-
mensional training image yi as d¯i, i = 1, . . . , N . Sim-
ilar to (10), we can compute the Euclidean distances
d¯i, i = 1, . . . , N as
d¯i= ∥(w¯ − yi)∥
2
2 = ∥(U
T
η −UTxi)∥
2
2,
=
m∑
k=1
(
uTk ηη
Tuk − 2u
T
k ηu
T
k xi + u
T
k xix
T
i uk
)
.(17)
Since, η = t + γ, we can write d¯i in terms of di, i =
1, . . . , N as
d¯i =
m∑
k=1
[
uTk (t+ γ)(t+ γ)
Tuk − 2u
T
k (t+ γ)u
T
k xi
+uTk xix
T
i uk
]
,
= di +
m∑
k=1
[
uTk
(
2tγT + γγT − 2γxTi
)
uk
]
. (18)
It is shown in Section 5.5 that the server cannot infer
di from (18). In the next subsection, we elaborate how
the distances obtained in (18) can be used to obtain
the matching training image.
5.4 Minimum distance calculation to match the
test image to a known class in private
Let us denote the difference between di
and d¯i in (18) as mi, i = 1, . . . , N (i.e.,
mi =
∑m
k=1
[
uTk (2tγ
T + γγT − 2γxTi )uk
]
). Let
us rewrite (18) as follows:
d¯i = di +mi, i = 1, . . . , N. (19)
In order to find the minimum distance, the server
needs to remove mi from d¯i. Since the server does not
know the vectors γ and t, it is infeasible for the server
to obtain a true distance value di from d¯i, i = 1, . . . , N .
Hence, the server cannot find the matching training
image corresponding to the test image using (19).
In order to obtain the matching image, the server
needs to interact with the client by sending all the
d¯i, i = 1, . . . , N . Before sending d¯i, i = 1, . . . , N , the
server generates random value ri for each d¯i and send
d˜i to the client where
d˜i = d¯i + ri = di +mi + ri, i = 1, . . . , N. (20)
Now the client must interact with the server to com-
pute mi+ri, i = 1, . . . , N . Using mi+ri, i = 1, . . . , N ,
the client can compute the actual Euclidean distances
di, i = 1, . . . , N as follows:
di = d˜i − (mi + ri), i = 1, . . . , N, (21)
where
mi + ri =
m∑
k=1
uTk (2tγ
T + γγT − 2γxTi )uk + ri.
Since t = t˜− x¯,
mi + ri=
m∑
k=1
uTk [2(˜t− x¯)γ
T + γγT − 2γxTi ]uk + ri,
=
m∑
k=1
uTk (2t˜γ
T − 2x¯γT + γγT − 2γxTi )uk + ri,
=
m∑
k=1
uTk [(2t˜+ γ)γ
T ]uk
−
m∑
k=1
uTk (2x¯γ
T + 2γxTi )uk + ri. (22)
It should be noted that mi, i = 1, . . . , N should
only be known to the client. Otherwise, if they are
known to the server, then the server can compute
the actual Euclidean distances between the test and
training images, and eventually the server can obtain
the expression corresponding to the test image which
violates the client’s privacy. In (22), the vectors t˜ and γ
are only known to the client and the vectors uk, xi, x¯
and the random scalar ri are known only to the server.
The vectors and scalars known to the server and client
are coupled with each other in (22) and it requires
large number of interactions between the client and
server to privately compute mi+ri. If we reorder (22)
such that, the variables known to the server to be on
one side while the variables known to the client to
other side then the algorithm in Table 1 can be used
to compute (22).
5.4.1 Solve (22) using the Algorithm in Table 1
In order to exploit the algorithm in Table 1, we must
rearrange variables in (22). In order to do this, let us
now process the first term in (22) (i.e.,
∑m
k=1 u
T
k [(2t˜+
γ)γT ]uk) using Kronecker identities as follows:
uTk [(2t˜+ γ)γ
T ]uk = vec
{
uTk [(2t˜+ γ)γ
T ]uk
}
,
= (uTk ⊗ u
T
k )[γ ⊗ (2t˜+ γ)] = (u
T
k γ)⊗
[
uTk (2t˜+ γ)
]
,
= (uTk γ)×
[
uTk (2t˜+ γ)
]
. (23)
Let us assume that the server generates random in-
tegers rki,1, r
k
i,2, r
k
i,3, and r
k
i,4, ∀k to randomize the
scalar product output. If we incorporate these random
variables within (23) then (23) becomes equal to (24)
(shown in the top of the next page).
In (24), the server knows uk, r
k
i,1, r
k
i,2, r
k
i,3,
and rki,4 while the client knows γ and 2t˜ + γ.
Hence, the client and server collaboratively compute[
uTk γ + r
k
i,1
]
,
[
uTk (2t˜+ γ) + r
k
i,2
]
,
[(
rki,2uk
)T
γ + rki,3
]
,
and
[(
rki,1uk
)T
(2t˜+ γ) + rki,4
]
using the algorithm
in Table 1. In order to balance the equation, the
server subtracts
(
rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 − r
k
i,4
)
in (24) in the
next computation. Now let us process the remaining
terms in (22) (i.e., −
∑m
k=1 u
T
k (2x¯γ
T +2γxTi )uk+ri) as
follows: [second term in (22)-
(
rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 − r
k
i,4
)
] =
−
∑m
k=1 u
T
k (2x¯γ
T+2γxTi )uk+ri−
(
rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 − r
k
i,4
)
can be transformed into (25) using Kronecker identi-
ties (shown in the top of the next page).
In (25), the server knows
2
[
(uTk ⊗ u
T
k x¯) + (u
T
k xi ⊗ u
T
k )
]
and ri+(r
k
i,1r
k
i,2−r
k
i,3−
rki,4) and the clients knows γ. Hence, the algorithm
in Table 1 can be exploited by both the client and
server in order to compute the [−
∑m
k=1 u
T
k (2x¯γ
T +
2γxTi )uk + ri −
(
rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 − r
k
i,4
)
]. Hence, using
(24), (25), and Table 1, the client can obtain (mi + ri)
∀i. This will enable the client to compute the true
Euclidean distances between the test image and the
training images using (21). Hence, the client can find
the smallest Euclidean distance using (11). Only task
now left is to find the expression of the training image
corresponding to the smallest Euclidean distance.
This task must be achieved without leaking the index
of the training image corresponding to the smallest
Euclidean distance to the server.
(uTk γ)×
[
u
T
k (2t˜+ γ)
]
+
(
r
k
i,1r
k
i,2−r
k
i,3−r
k
i,4
)
=
[
u
T
k γ+r
k
i,1
]
×
[
u
T
k (2t˜+γ)+r
k
i,2
]
−
[(
r
k
i,2uk
)T
γ+rki,3
]
−
[(
r
k
i,1uk
)T
(2t˜+ γ)+rki,4
]
.
(24)
−uTk (2x¯γ
T+2γxTi )uk + ri − (r
k
i,1r
k
i,2−r
k
i,3−r
k
i,4) = −2vec(u
T
k x¯γ
T
uk)− 2vec(u
T
k γx
T
i uk) + ri − (r
k
i,1r
k
i,2−r
k
i,3−r
k
i,4),
= −2
[
(uTk ⊗ u
T
k x¯)+(u
T
k xi ⊗ u
T
k )
]
vec(γ) + ri − (r
k
i,1r
k
i,2−r
k
i,3−r
k
i,4). (25)
5.4.2 Privacy-preserving Expression Finding
Let us define a binary vector db ∈ {0, 1}
N×1. If nth
Euclidean distance is the smallest distance then, the
client generates a binary vector db by setting nth
element to 1 while setting all other elements to 0. Let
us denote the expression of nth training image as idn
and define another vector called expression vector as
dexp = [exp1, exp2 , . . . , expN ]
T . Client must keep the
binary vector db away from the server in order to
protect the privacy of the test image. However, the
client could exploit the algorithm in Table 1 to obtain
the expression of the test image without revealing
the db as follows: The expression of the training
image which is corresponding to the smallest
Euclidean distance (i.e., lets assume nth training
image) could be obtained by computing dTb dexp (i.e.,
[0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0].[exp1 . . . , expn, expn+1, . . . , expN ]
T =
expn). It should be noted that the algorithm in Table
1 but with different inputs can be used to obtain the
correct expression of the matching training image. If
the client feeds the binary vector db instead of a and
if the server feeds the expression vector dexp instead
of s.b and 0 for r to the algorithm in Table 1, then
the output of the algorithm should be equivalent to
the expression of the matching training image.
5.5 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyse whether our algorithm
is vulnerable to any privacy leakage. Our algorithm
is based on two-party computation and the only
possibility that the privacy leakage can happen is
during the interaction between two-parties. We use
the following O. Goldreich’s privacy definition to
proof that our method doesn’t leak any unintended
information to client or server:
Privacy definition for the secure two-party computation:
A secure two-party protocol should not reveal more
information to a semi-honest party than the informa-
tion that can be induced by looking at that partys
input and output. The formal proof of the definition
can be found in [40].
Let us verify whether the proposed two-party com-
putation satisfies the privacy definition. As described
in Section 5, the proposed algorithm is composed of
four sub-algorithms. In the following we show what
are the inputs and outputs to and from the client and
server, respectively. This will clearly highlight what
is already known to client and server. Hence if we
can prove that nothing else can be inferred other than
the known input and output with higher posterior
probability than prior probability then the proposed
algorithm satisfies the privacy definition.
The ultimate aim for client is to keep the test
image and the classification result away from the
server while the server wants to keep the classification
parameters away from the client. Initially (Section
5.1, Section 5.2, and Section 5.3), the client was just
sending the noise vector η˜ ∈ Zn×1 to the server
instead the true test image t˜ ∈ Zn×1. From these
inputs, the server only know the size of the test image.
This is not a privacy leakage since the server knows
the size of the images when training the classifier.
In return the server sends the randomized Eu-
clidean distances back to the client. As shown in Sec-
tion 5.4, the server hides the Euclidean distance d¯i by
random integer ri where |ri| > |d¯i| in order to achieve
information-theoretic security. The upper bound of
|d¯i| for an 256× 256 image is 256× 256× (2
8)2 < 248,
hence |ri| = 48-bits is sufficiently enough to achieve
the information-theoretic security.
In Section 5.4.1, the client and server interact with
each other using the algorithm in Table 1 in order
to compute the true Euclidean distances. The clients
inputs are γ and (2t˜ + γ). As proved in Theorem 2,
information-theoretic security can be achieved when
the client’s input data is less than 1024-bits. Hence,
the server cannot learn any unindented knowledge.
Similarly for the server, if |rki,1| > |u
T
k γ| ∀i, k,
|rki,2| > |u
T
k (2t˜ + γ)| ∀i, k, |r
k
i,3| > |
(
rki,2uk
)T
γ| ∀i, k,
|rki,4| > |
(
rki,1uk
)T
(2t˜ + γ)| ∀i, k, and |rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 −
rki,4| > | − 2
[
(uTk ⊗ u
T
k x¯)+(u
T
k xi ⊗ u
T
k )
]
vec(γ), ∀i, k|
then the client cannot learn any additional knowledge
from individual scalar products. Below we show that
client and sever knows the required size of random
number to randomize the inputs.
The client’s inputs are γ and 2t˜+ γ where |γ| = 8-
bits and |2t˜ + γ| = 10-bits. Since the client’s inputs
i.e., |γα| = 88−bits and |(2t˜ + γ)α| = 90−bits, are
substantially smaller than 1024-bits, the clients data
is information-theoretically secure. Since the server
knows the size of the clients input data as well as
the sizes of the elements in uk, and x¯, the server can
compute the required sizes of the random integers rki,1,
rki,2, r
k
i,3, and r
k
i,4 to information-theoretically secure its
parameters. Based on the experiment we obtained that
|rki,1| = 45 > |u
T
k γ| ∀i, k, |r
k
i,2| = 45 > |u
T
k (2t˜+γ)| ∀i, k,
Angry(AN) Disgust(DI) Fear(FE) Happy(HA) Neutral(NE) Sad(SA) Surprise(SU)
Fig. 1. Example FaE images from JAFFE (1st row) and MUG (2nd row) databases. The 3rd row depicts the
expression classes.
|rki,3| = 100 > |
(
rki,2uk
)T
γ| ∀i, k, |rki,4| = 100 >
|
(
rki,1uk
)T
(2t˜ + γ)| ∀i, k, and |rki,1r
k
i,2 − r
k
i,3 − r
k
i,4| >
| − 2
[
(uTk ⊗ u
T
k x¯)+(u
T
k xi ⊗ u
T
k )
]
vec(γ), ∀i, k|.
In Section 5.4.2, the client and server interact with
each other using the algorithm in Table 1 in order to
identify the matching sample. The size of the client’s
input data is 1−bit which is smaller than the required
1024−bits of input data, hence the data is information-
theoretically secure. Since the server knows the sizes
of the client’s input data, it can compute the appro-
priate size of random integers in order to protect the
expression vector from the client.
At high level, the client’s inputs are element wise
randomized before sending them to the server, hence,
according to information theory, the client’s inputs
are secure. At the end client obtain the Euclidean
distance between client’s test image and the server’s
training image. However, the client cannot infer any
additional information compromise the server’s clas-
sification parameters from the Euclidean distance for
the following reasons: Euclidean distance is just a
positive scalar which was obtained by from feature
vectors. From (9) and (10), it is obvious that the
scalar value is an aggregated value obtained from
large number of variables. Inferring those variables
(classification parameters) from a scalar is impossible.
Even if the adversary send different inputs, due to the
inherent properties of (9) and (10), the outcome will
always be a scalar version of previous values.
6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The proposed FEC method was evaluated using two
FaE databases: JAFFE [32] and MUG [33]. Fig. 1 shows
sample images and expression categories from both
the databases. The JAFFE database contains facial
images of ten Japanese females, where each has two
to four samples for each expression. In total, there
are 213 greyscale FaE images in this database, each of
pixel resolution 256×256. The MUG database contains
image sequences of FaEs belonging to 86 subjects
comprising of 35 women and 51 men. Each image
is of resolution 896 × 896. In our experiments we
use images of 52 subjects, where two to four images
were extracted from image sequences per subject per
expression, totalling 1022 images. For the purpose of
computational efficiency, all the images were resized
to 51 × 51 pixels. The number of images used in our
experiments and their resolutions are listed in Table
4. In our experiments we convert all the images into
8−bit grayscale images, where each pixel value is 8-bit
long.
TABLE 4
Details of utilized images from JAFFE and MUG.
Database Subjects Images per Class Resolution
JAFFE 10 28∼32 51 × 51
MUG 52 110∼120 51 × 51
In this section we attempt to show that the pro-
posed method doesn’t degrade the classification accu-
racy due to the randomization. Hence, in this paper,
without loss of generality, we use leave-one-out [35]
strategy. More precisely, one image is removed from
the database and all the remaining images are used
for training, while the removed image is used as a
test image. This procedure is repeated for a different
left out test image each time until all the images are
tested. Then we represented the results as a confusion
matrix (as shown in Table 5 and Table 7). The accuracy
can be inferred in different ways from the confusion
matrix i.e., precision, recall, specificity, false positive
rate, Matthews correlation coefficient, F1-score and
accuracy etc. However the work in [29] uses preci-
sion × 100 i.e., the ratio between correctly identified
expression and total images tested under the same
expression times 100. The same strategy applied in
this paper too.
The transformation matrix U in (4) can be ob-
tained using generalized eigenvectors of matrix pairs
{SB,SW} if SW is non-singular. Since the number of
images used for training in this experiment is smaller
than the size of the image vector (i.e., N < n), the
matrix SW becomes singular. In order to overcome
this issue, we exploit the technique used in [23], where
PCA transformation matrix WP has been used to
reduce the dimension of the input space such that
SW becomes non-singular in the reduced dimensional
space. Using WP and (4), the LFDA based transfor-
mation matrix WL can be obtained as
WL = argmax
Z
| ZTWTPSBWPZ |
| ZTWTPSWWPZ |
. (26)
Note that the LFDA transformation matrix U is
composed of generalized eigenvectors of matrices of
{WTPSBWP ,W
T
PSWWP }. Now the modified trans-
formation matrix U = WPWL will be used in (2)
and (8) for dimensionality reduction.
In FEC literature, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no theory defines how to choose the fea-
ture vectors (i.e., how many feature vectors or which
feature vectors) to get optimal classification accuracy.
The only way is to do this is based on trial and
error. An extensive simulation was conducted in [29]
by checking the accuracy against different number
of combinations for size of WP and WL. To avoid
repetition and to maintain fair comparison between
proposed work and [29], we use the same parameters
obtained in [29] for the following experiments.
6.1 Experiments on the JAFFE Database
This subsection describes our series of experiments
on the JAFFE database. Initially, we should obtain the
dimensions of the WP and the WL corresponding
to best classification accuracy. In order to compare
the performance of the proposed method against the
Paillier encryption based technique and the conven-
tional technique (i.e., without privacy preservation),
we exploit the parameter details used in [29]. Denote
the dimension ofWP as p and that ofWL as l. Fig. 2
depicts the recognition rates for various values of p
and l. In Fig. 2, top accuracy of 94.37% is achieved
when p = 90 and l = 40. Table 5 shows the confusion
matrix corresponding to the top recognition rate. Note
that for some classes, e.g. the SA class, the recognition
rate tends to be lower than other expression classes
because the class is highly confused with other ex-
pressions [36]. We consider only the top recognition
case (i.e., p = 90 and l = 40) to evaluate the proposed
scheme. To illustrate the effect of the scalar s in
Table 1, we obtained the classification accuracy of the
proposed algorithm for five different scalar values and
the results were plotted in Fig. 3. In the same figure,
we plotted the accuracy of [29] against the scaling
factor and the accuracy of conventional scheme ex-
plained in Section 4. Our algorithm performs better
than [29] for the smaller scaling factors. Also our
algorithm achieves the maximum accuracy faster than
[29]. This is due to the fact that the work in [29]
uses the scaling factor right from the beginning of the
classification process (from calculating the difference
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Fig. 2. Recognition rate for various dimensions ofWP
andWL for JAFFE database [29].
TABLE 5
Confusion matrix for JAFFE database.
AN DI FE HA NE SA SU Accuracy
AN 29 1 0 0 0 0 0 96.7%
DI 0 27 1 0 0 1 0 93.1%
FE 0 1 30 0 0 0 1 93.8%
HA 0 0 0 29 1 1 0 93.5%
NE 0 0 0 0 30 0 0 100%
SA 0 0 2 1 0 28 0 90.3%
SU 1 1 0 0 0 0 28 93.3%
Average Accuracy 94.37%
test vector). However, our algorithm uses the scaling
factor to remove random noise from the Euclidean
distances (at the very end of the classification process).
This makes our algorithms to reduce the number
of errors compared to [29] when the scaling factors
are small. The crucial point is that the classification
accuracies of both the algorithms eventually become
equal to the accuracy of the conventional approach
(i.e., 94.37 percent) when s is at a sufficient level,
in this case s > 104. Hence, our algorithm doesn’t
degrade the classification accuracy due to the privacy
preservation.
TABLE 6
Dimensions of PCA and LFDA used to get best
performance in MUG database.
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Total images 350 567 840
Images per class 50 81 120
Dimension of PCA 150 160 300
Dimension of LFDA 40 40 50
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6.2 Experiments on the MUG Database
The MUG database contains more facial images than
the JAFFE database and includes images of both men
and women. Using the MUG database we studied
different class sizes against accuracy, scaling factor,
dimension of PCA and dimension of LFDA. In partic-
ular, we considered three experiments with different
class sizes: Exp. 1: 50 images per class, Exp. 2: 81
images per class and Exp 3: 120 images per class.
We then empirically obtained the dimensions of PCA
and LFDA corresponding to best classification accu-
racy. Table 6 shows the details of these parameters.
Then experiments similar to the JAFFE database were
conducted for MUG database using the proposed
method, Paillier encryption based method [29], and
conventional scheme. Fig. 4 compares the top classi-
fication accuracies for all three methods and for all
three class sizes. In Fig. 4, all three methods achieve
same accuracy since scaling factor s = 106 has been
used. This is due to the fact that the error caused
by integer approximation is compensated by larger
scaling factor.
Top recognition rate 95.24% is achieved when the
number of images per class is equal to 81 while the
performances of other two experiments were below
95%. Hence, the accuracy is not monotonically in-
creasing with the class size. From Table 6 and Fig.
4, the dimension of the WP used for dimensionality
reduction increases with that of the class size while
the dimension of the WL remains nearly the same
despite increase in class size. The crucial point is
that the accuracy of the proposed method is same as
the accuracies of existing methods regardless of class
sizes. Hence the proposed method doesn’t degrade
the performance due to the size of the problem.
In order to evaluate the relation between scaling
factor and classification accuracy, we consider the
top recognition case. The confusion matrix for the
case of 81 facial images per class without privacy
preservation is given in Table 7 when the total number
of images, dimensions of PCA, and dimensions of
LFDA are 567, 160, and 40, respectively. Then we
obtained the accuracies of each expression class by
varying the scaling factor using the proposed method.
The bar chart in Fig. 5 demonstrates that the num-
ber of correctly classified images per class increases
monotonically with the scaling factor. The proposed
method achieves the results in Table 7 when s = 104.
Hence, the proposed method performs equally well as
conventional scheme regardless of type of expression
class.
350 567 84092
92.5
93
93.5
94
94.5
95
95.5
%
 o
f C
or
re
ct
ly 
Cl
as
sif
ie
d 
Im
ag
es
Number of Images per Experiment
 
 
Proposed Scheme
Paillier Homomorphic Scheme [29]
Conventional Scheme
Fig. 4. Comparison of proposed method on MUG.
TABLE 7
Confusion matrix for MUG database in plain domain.
AN DI FE HA NE SA SU Accuracy
AN 78 0 1 0 2 0 0 96.30%
DI 0 76 1 2 0 1 1 93.83%
FE 2 1 72 1 2 0 3 88.89%
HA 1 1 2 77 0 0 0 95.06%
NE 1 1 0 0 79 0 0 97.53%
SA 0 0 0 0 0 80 1 98.77%
SU 1 0 1 0 0 1 78 96.30%
Average Accuracy 95.24%
6.3 Computational and Communication complex-
ity
We now compare the complexity of the proposed
algorithm against [29]. The recommended key size for
Paillier encryption based scheme in [29] is 1024-bits,
hence for the sake of comparison, we consider 1024-
bits long random integers in the proposed scheme and
show that our algorithm still outperforms [29].
6.3.1 Computational complexity
In order to compare these works, let us set, without
loss of generality, the security parameter to 1024
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Fig. 5. Number of images correctly classified in ran-
domized domain for each class for different scaling
factors.
bits and denote the computational time (in ms) for
multiplication, modulo exponentiation in 1024 bits
field as Cm and Ce, respectively. Table 8 compares
the complexity of both the schemes for both the
server (S) and client (C) (the size of the images, total
number of training images, and the total number
of feature vectors are denoted as n, N , and m) in
terms of the number of modulo exponentiations and
multiplications. From [37], we can roughly estimate
Ce ≈ 240Cm. Let us define computational efficiencies
of the proposed algorithm against [29] at the client
side and the server side as eC and eS , respectively
where
eC =
Complexity for client in [29]
Complexity for client in proposed method
,
eS =
Complexity for server in [29]
Complexity for server in proposed algorithm
.
Table 9 shows the computational efficiency of the
proposed algorithm for different set of parameters.
In Table 9, we calculate the efficiency at both the
client and server side by varying the parametersm,N ,
and n. The computational complexity to the client in
the proposed algorithm is almost 120 times less than
the complexity required for [29]. At the server side,
our algorithm outperforms when the total number
of training images (N ) is less than 300. When N
increases, the efficiency of the proposed algorithm at
the server side drops slightly compared to [29] if we
don’t consider the parallel computation.
It is obvious from Table 8 and Table 9 that the
computation time at the server is dominated by
mN(n + 1)Cm i.e., Section 5.3 in Table 8. In fact this
computation, as shown in Fig. 6, can be performed in
parallel by splitting this into mN X (n+1)Cm i.e., mN
parallel computations. These computations are repre-
TABLE 8
Comparison of computational cost.
Section for Method in [29]
Proposed
Method
5.1
C n(Cm + Ce) –
S n(2Cm + Ce) –
5.2
C – –
S m(n− 1)Cm +mnCe –
5.3
C NCm 2nCm
S
[(2 + 5m)Cm + (1 +
4m)Ce]N
mN(n+
1)Cm
5.4
C (2Cm + Ce)log2N NCm
S (9Cm + 3Ce)log2N (n+ 1)Cm
Total
C
(n+N + 2log2N)Cm +
(n+ log2N)Ce
(2n+
N)Cm
S
[2n+(n−1)m+(2+5m)N+
9log2N ]Cm + (n+mn+
N + 4mN + 3log2N)Ce
(mN +
1)(n+
1)Cm
Fig. 6. Parallel Computation at server side.
sented in (24) and (25). In fact, for these computations
the client needs to send only γ and (2t˜ + γ) to the
server. Then the server can compute those the five
scalar products (shown in (24) and (25) or in Fig. 6)
for all feature vectors and training images in parallel
since these computations are independent from each
other (note that these scalar products are computed
using PP algorithm in Table 1). This approach reduces
the computational time at the server side approxi-
mately by mN times i.e., if m = 10 and N = 300
then parallel computation reduces the computational
time by approximately 3000 times. Even though the
proposed algorithm increases the computational task
to the server (when N > 300), if we assume that
the server could be cloud and capable to perform
parallel computations, then the computational time
can be reduced substantially. At the same time it is
not possible to perform parallel computation in [29]
since the Euclidian distance comparison is dependent
on previous comparison.
It is also worth noting that even though the MUG
database is almost five times larger than the JAFFE
database, their is no substantial difference in top
recognition rates between the two databases (i.e.,
top recognition rates of JAFFE and MUG are 94.37%
and 95.24%, respectively), so if it is desired that the
server side overall overhead be further reduced then
one could consider sticking with smaller databases
without needing to substantially compromise the clas-
sification performance.
TABLE 9
Comparison of computational efficiency of the
proposed algorithm against [29] .
n = 10000 n = 20000 n = 30000
m N eC eS eC eS eC eS
10 200 119 1.42 119 1.37 120 1.35
20 200 119 1.36 119 1.31 120 1.29
10 400 118 0.76 119 0.71 119 0.69
20 400 118 0.73 119 0.69 119 0.66
10 800 116 0.43 118 0.38 119 0.36
20 800 116 0.41 118 0.37 118 0.35
6.3.2 Communication complexity
We measured the total communication complexity in
terms of data being communicated between the server
and client. In our algorithm, the client and server
use only 8-bit size of data during the difference test
vector calculation and projection steps. Later they use
1024-bits size of data and interact via the secure two-
party algorithm proposed in Table 1. Let us compare
the communication complexity for JAFFE database.
In the proposed scheme, the client initially sends
2× 2501× 1024-bits (i.e., n = 2501) to the server. Then
the server sends back 2 × 40 × 212 × 1024 + 1 (i.e.,
N = 212, andm = 40) size of data to the client. Finally,
in order to find the identity of the matched image,
the client sends 1024 × 212-bits to the server which
sends back another 1024-bits to the client. In total, the
communication bandwidth required for our algorithm
is 2.84MB. However, the communications complexity
of the Paillier cryptography based method in [29]
requires (n+m+1)× 2048 = (2501+40+1)× 2048 =
0.65MB bandwidth for the difference test vector com-
putation and projection steps. For the match finding
steps, [29] requires 6N × 2048 + N(2l + 1) × 1024 =
6 × 212 × 2048 + 212 × (106 + 1) × 2048 = 3.23MB.
In total, [29] requires 3.72MB of bandwidth, when
security parameter is 1024, which is nearly 31 percent
higher than the proposed approach.
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight FEC to
outsource the data classification task to the untrusted
third-parties. We exploited randomization technique
to preserve the privacy of the client and server side
parameters. Since the proposed method is developed
using randomization, the computational and commu-
nication complexities were substantially reduced com-
pared to the existing schemes. In order to validate the
proposed method, we have experimented our method
on popular FaE databases. The experiment results
show that the classification accuracy of the proposed
method is the same as the traditional approach (which
has no privacy preservation) while preserving the
privacy of the subjects involved in the classification.
This proves the reliability of the proposed method.
Let us discuss some limitations and possible future
works in this area. The proposed algorithm used
LFDA and NN techniques to achieve accuracy above
95% for the JAFFE and MUG databases. However, as
seen in [38], the same techniques are not sufficient
to achieve a better classification accuracy when the
expressions are spontaneous [39]. Hence, developing
PP algorithms for more robust techniques such as
local feature analysis, Gabor features, non-negative
matrix factorization and local nonnegative matrix fac-
torization, and local binary pattern are crucial.
The proposed scheme required to send the whole
image to the server for classification where the por-
tion corresponds to the expression is substantially
lower than the whole image. Hence the computational
complexity could be further reduced by not sending
the redundant image potions to the server. Instead
client could use techniques such as SIFT to extract
some of non-sensitive features in plain domain. Hence
developing a PP algorithm to share classification task
between client-and server might further reduced the
complexity.
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